Rivalry or Economic Opportunity? What Determines Proxy Intervention in Conflicts

Abstract

After the 2011 NATO-led military intervention in Libya, requiring the coordinated effort of three Great Powers to pass a once-in-a-decade UN Security Council Resolution, states seeking to influence the outcome of civil wars in the MENA region, favoured the use of proxy forces instead of military interventions. Despite this turn in foreign policy, studies of conflicts explain this recent trend primarily on bilateral rivalry. Indeed, bilateral rivalry can explain a state’s foreign policy of intervention when its rival is involved in the civil war, but how much can rivalry in the MENA region influence the foreign policy choice of forging a sponsorship relationship with a proxy? I compare recent civil wars in the MENA region and use a novel approach, Comparative Case Analysis, to examine the foreign policy decision of states. The results showcase that merely the presence of a rival in the civil war cannot lead to proxy support. Powerful regional actors search for opportunity structures combined with rivalry to support a proxy. Autocracies, on the other hand, with low military effectiveness search for opportunity structures to support a proxy.